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Abstract
This article compares a set of often used simple contracts or mech-
anisms in terms of how well they allocate decision rights between two
agents over time. A basic assumption is that agents incur a ¯xed cost
each time they renegotiate. The contracts or mechanisms studied are:
individual ownership and authority, the ¯rst-come ¯rst-serve rule, the
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2alternating rule and the sign-up rule. One trade-o® that arises is the
following: when usage of the asset is °exible in the sense that it does
not matter in which period it occurs, agents may rely on obtaining the
asset through arriving ¯rst at some point, while when an agent needs to
time and plan the use of the asset, he or she may wish to hold stronger
rights or to use the sign-up rule as a simple form of contracting. (JEL:
D10, D23, L22); Keywords: Incomplete contracts, individual ownership,
¯rst-come ¯rst-serve rule, costly renegotiation.
31. Introduction
When two agents share an asset or a resource over time, as when two house-
holds share a washing machine or when central and local management in an
organization allocate decision rights between them, they often face a choice
between mechanisms or contracts that are all simple1 and incomplete (i.e. less
contingent than a Pareto-optimal contract). Presumably, the reason that only
such mechanisms or contracts are realistic lies in the cost of elaborate contract-
ing and in the fact that the mechanism or contract can be renegotiated as time
passes, which diminishes the need for ex-ante contracting2. However, when it
is costly to contract, it is also likely to be costly to recontract or renegotiate,
which the agents should take into account when choosing between di®erent
kinds of simple mechanisms or contracts. This paper assumes that a ¯xed cost
° is incurred each time renegotiation occurs, and analyzes which factors then
determine the choice between simple contracts or mechanisms for allocating a
good or resource over time.
The simple contracts or mechanisms are: the dictatorial right usually asso-
ciated with individual ownership, the priority rule, the ¯rst-come ¯rst-serve
rule, the alternating rule3, and the sign-up rule. The dictatorial right grants
all decision rights over an asset exclusively to one agent which implies that
the others must ask permission of him or her before making decisions concern-
ing the asset. The priority rule is a modi¯ed form of the dictatorial rule; it
stipulates that one agent may use the asset whenever he or she desires, while
the other may use the asset if and only if the agent with priority does not
1Simplicity of a mechanism will not be precisely de¯ned in this paper, but it may be noted
that the mechanisms referred to as simple do not require distinguishing di®erent periods or
contingencies and do not require memory on the part of the agents.
2On the foundations of assuming incomplete contracts, see Hart and Moore (1999), Segal
(1999) and Shavell (1998).
3The alternating rule will not be studied as much as the other mechanisms, but will be
mentioned in some contexts.
4(actively) claim it. The di®erence between the dictatorial rule and the priority
rule arises when the former agent does not express a desire to use the asset;
the other agent may then use the asset if the priority rule - but not if the
dictatorial rule - prevails. The ¯rst-come rule simply grants the decision right
to the agent who arrives ¯rst to the asset4, while the alternating rule stipulates
that the right to decide alternates through time. The sign-up rule allocates a
given number of decision rights over the good to each agent who must then
reserve the right to decide on the use of an asset for this number of future
periods.
In the example of two households sharing a washing machine, all of the
mechanisms are realistic possibilities, whereas in the example of the allocation
of decision rights within a hierarchy, the main choice may be between the
dictatorial rule and the priority rule. In a hierarchy, the dictatorial rule may
be interpreted as the rule that local management may not implement (local)
projects without the consent of central management while the priority rule may
be interpreted as the rule that local management may do so unless central
management has intervened5. However, the ¯rst-come rule may also be a
possibility, implying that whoever has an idea ¯rst about how to use an asset
(as modeled by Hart and Moore (1999)) may implement it.
Note also that in both of these examples the cost of renegotiation seems
real. To change an allocation ¯xed by the simple mechanism, the two parties
must get in contact, communicate and possibly bargain, all of which can be
time-consuming activities.
Other simple contracts exist than those which will be analyzed in this paper.
For example, a prevalent simple contract stipulates that one person may use the
washing machine on all Mondays and Tuesdays, the other on all Wednesdays
and Thursdays etc, and there exist simple contracts that employ the pay-per-
use principle. However, since the purpose of this article is mainly to point to
4It is worth noting that arriving to the good may be interpreted as becoming ready to
use the asset, e.g. because one gets an idea about how to use the asset, see Hart and Moore
(1999).
5Thus, Hart and Moore (1999) associate the priority rule with hierarchy.
5a framework for analyzing the choice between simple contracts and to suggest
some factors that are important in the choice of mechanism, no attempt is
made to analyze the full set of realistic simple contracts.
The main factors determining the choice of mechanism may be discussed
informally as follows6: The ¯rst-come rule is °exible in the sense that if either
of the two agents needs the asset at some point, perhaps unexpectedly, he or
she may obtain the asset without bargaining if the other is not already using
it. Thus, the ¯rst-come rule may economize on renegotiation costs. However,
when an agent needs to plan the use of the asset, to time the use of it in
order to ¯t it into a schedule, the agent may wish to have predictable access
to the asset. Predictability may then be more important than °exibility. The
agent for whom predictability is important may then wish to acquire stronger
rights through the dictatorial rule, the priority rule or the sign-up rule. If
both agents want predictability, the sign-up rule may be optimal, i.e. it may be
optimal to enter into a simple kind of explicit contract. The sign-up rule may
also eliminate uncertainty or risk: under the ¯rst-come rule, availability of the
good may become uncertain if the other agent's utility is private information
or if the other may often arrive ¯rst. An agent may then fear that his or
her most important needs for the good will not be satis¯ed, especially when
renegotiation costs are so high that the good cannot be obtained through
renegotiation. The same risk is run by the non-owner in case of the dictatorial
and the priority right while it may avoided through the simple explicit contract
of the sign-up rule. This is the principle that contracting may be worth the cost
when agents are risk averse and when contracting can eliminate or lower risk.
However, if planning and the elimination of uncertainty cannot be attained in
this way because needs are strongly stochastic, the sign-up rule loses some of its
rationale and the ¯rst-come rule or -if needs are asymmetric- the dictatorial
or the priority rule may be preferable.
In relation to existing literature, this paper follows the line of organiza-
tional research associated with, among others, Coase (1937), Simon (1951),
Williamson (1985), Wernerfelt (1997), Baker, Gibbons and Murphy (2002a),
(2002b), Hart and Moore (1999), Hart and Holmstr¿m (2002), Levin and
6There are other factors, the analysis is also not exhaustive in this sense.
6Rayo(2003), and Simester and Knez (2002) in stressing the cost of contracting
and recontracting (renegotiating).
Wernerfelt explains the choice between three mechanisms or game forms: the
hierarchy-, the price list- and the negotiation-as-needed game form, in terms
of how well they economize on communication costs while ensuring an e±cient
adaptation of sequences of acts. Thus, while the present and Wernerfelt's ar-
ticle do not analyze the exact same set of implicit contracts, they are closely
related in that they both analyze the optimality of alternative implicit con-
tracts when renegotiation is costly. As another di®erence, Wernerfelt does not
apply the framework of arriving to the asset; he assumes, in the case of the hi-
erarchy, that there is a given string of actions, chosen initially by the employer,
which an employee should carry out in the absence of adaptive instructions.
Also, Wernerfelt assumes that there can be no communication when the game
form is hierarchial, while this is only ruled out in this paper if ° is high.
Hart and Moore (1999) de¯ne a hierarchy in terms of the priority right7: In a
centralized organization, the boss can implement his idea about how to use the
asset (which can be interpreted as making a decision in some domaine) while
subordinates can implement their idea if and only if the boss does not have an
idea. As indicated above, `getting an idea' in Hart and Moore's model can be
interpreted within the framework of this paper, as `arriving' to the asset. In
this interpretation the present paper addresses why the priority right is often
an e±cient rule in hierarchies, and may extend the model by Hart and Moore
by allowing bosses and subordinates to communicate and bargain about which
idea should be implemented, which Hart and Moore rule out by assuming that
° is prohibitively high.
Building on their prior work (2002a), Baker, Gibbons and Murphy (2002b)
analyze how di®erent kinds of strategic alliances between two ¯rms may be
thought of as di®erent governance structures i.e. as di®erent allocations of de-
7A working paper version of the present paper was written before the Hart and Moore
paper (they make a reference to my working paper); in revising the working paper, I have
extended the discussion of the role of planning (carrying out ideas) that Hart and Moore
emphasize.
7cision rights over joint projects. The governance structure are: mergers (which
they do not analyze), alliances (both ¯rms have a veto right), acquisitions (one
¯rm decides unilaterally, corresponding to the dictatorial right ), joint ventures
(each of the two ¯rms may carry out ideas, corresponding to the ¯rst-come rule)
and divestitures (a third party owns the common project and is given auton-
omy). The authors assume that decision rights cannot be re-allocated through
bargaining, and justify this by noting that one does not observe ownership
°ipping back and forth (see their footnote on page 12); however, they add that
there exists some evidence that decision rights are renegotiated as alliances
often become sales. In the context of the present paper, this evidence would
suggest a high °:
One central aspect of Baker, Gibbons and Murphy's framework is omitted
from the present approach, namely the idea that the parties may act e±ciently
when they otherwise risk losing future rents from cooperation. This aspect is
central also to the contribution by Levin and Rayo who derive a bene¯t in
terms of economizing on relational capital of centralizing decision rights in
the hands of one party8. In the present paper, it is assumed that relational
capital is su±cient to induce the parties to respect the allocation of decision
rights agreed upon ex-ante, but not su±cient to induce them to carry out the
e±cient decision in each period (e.g. to leave the asset to the other when that
is e±cient).
2. The Model
Two agents, A and B, decide which mechanism to use for a given period
of time, and are assumed to adhere to the mechanism that they have agreed
on, i.e. the rule is assumed to be self-enforcing9. The period will consist of n
subperiods where only one of the two agents can use the given asset. In each
8The idea is, in short, that if a given future surplus provides an agent wiith an incentive
to make one decision e±ciently, the same surplus may also provide incentives for the same
agent to make another decision e±ciently.
9The implicit assumption is hence either that agents adhere to the rule because they
have internalized the norm of not breaking agreements or that the game analyzed is part of
a self-enforcing repeated game that for simplicity is not included.
8subperiod either A or B arrives ¯rst to the resource or asset10, and the rule
then determines whether it is necessary for the agent to achieve the consent
of the other agent before using the asset. If so, bargaining may take place
and the one who has the decision-right (who is the ¯rst-comer in the case of a
¯rst-come rule) may require compensation to let the other use the asset. Also,
the agent with the right may contact the other in order to rent out the asset
for one subperiod.
Renegotiation is assumed to concern the allocation of the decision- right
and not how the asset should be used to possibly satisfy the interests of both
agents. The assumption is that one agent must carry out the decision, that he
or she may know little about the needs of the other agent11, and that the other
agent cannot easily communicate his or her needs to the decision maker. Under
these circumstances it is realistic to assume that all which can be contracted
for, both ex-ante and ex-post, are decision rights12.
Bargaining takes the form of take-it-or-leave-it o®ers by which the agents
by exchanging two messages, an o®er and a reply (acceptance or rejection),
can realize the e±cient allocation. The compensation should not necessarily
be thought of as monetary; the idea is that they communicate to reach an
agreement whereby the agent who needs the asset most obtains it, but must
compensate the other in the form of a monetary payment or in the form of
a future favor13. Each time renegotiation occurs, it is assumed to cost °,
re°ecting not only the time spent bargaining but also the cost of getting in
contact. Ideally, it would be preferable to provide microfoundations for this
cost (e.g. in a model where agents may be more or less spatially separated and
may reach each other through di®erent media such as the telephone, e-mail or
10Naturally, we will consider the case where the probability of arriving ¯rst is a®ected by
the person's need or by the person's rigth to use the asset.
11In the example of the washing machine, which clothes the other would prefer to wash.
12This assumption is also made by Baker, Gibbons and Murphy (2002b) in their static
setting; they justify the assumption by reference to the action being unveri¯ able. Note,
howeverm that they move on to suggest that actions and not only decision rights becomes
contractible under relational contracting where the lack of veri¯ability plays a smaller role.
13Sometimes the future favor will not be agreed on but only expected which clearly saves
on bargaining costs (but does not eliminate the cost of getting in touch and communicate).
9through approaching and talking to each other), but no such foundation will
be provided in this paper.
A0s utility over time can be written as UA(x) where x = (x1; x2:::xn), and
xi = 1 if A uses the good in subperiod i, while xi = 0 if A does not. B's utility
can similarly be written UB(y), where y = (y1; y2:::yn); and where yi is one or
zero. As a special case, utilities over time may be additively time-separable. In
this case, the utility of an allocation in any given period will be una®ected by
what happens in other periods. Then A's utility in subperiod i from using the
asset will be termed uiA while B's utility will be termed uiB, i = 1:::n: Utilities
are assumed to be common knowledge, and non-stochastic14.
To fully de¯ne the priority rule, we must de¯ne what happens when A has the
priority right but B arrives ¯rst and begins to use the asset before A appears.
A then has the right to the asset but B cannot be said to have violated A's
right. In this situation, two polar cases will be analyzed; where B's use can
be stopped at no cost in terms of production losses etc, and where it is simply
not possible to interrupt B 0s use of the asset. When interruption is possible,
A may contact B to either tell him that she will take over the asset, or to
extract a payment from B. In the former case, communication in itself will be
assumed to cost °1, while when a payment is extracted the cost will be ° as
before, where ° > °1. If A takes over the asset total utility will be uiA ¡ °115,
while it will be uiB ¡ ° when A extracts a payment from B. Furthermore, it
can be assumed that when A has priority or the dictatorial right and B arrives
¯rst, B will not attempt to extract a payment from A; sinceA may then simply
claim the asset. When interruption is not possible, and B arrives ¯rst, it will
be assumed that he will start using the asset when A has the priority right
but will abstain when A has the dictatorial right.
14It seems worth exploring the consequences of assuming asymmetry of information, as
this is both the more realistic case and the case which naturally leads to a cost of bargain-
ing. However, introducing asymmetry of information complicates the analysis, and is not
necessary for the purposes of this paper.
15Assuming also that B neither su®ers a loss from interruption nor has gained utility from
using the asset before the interruption.
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Finally, it is assumed that the agents initially bargain in a Coasian fashion
about the mechanism to be used, i.e. they choose the Pareto-e±cient rule.
3. Analysis
The factors determining the choice of mechanism will be analyzed in the
following three sections.
3.1. On the role of relative needs
The Pareto-e±cient rule or mechanism depends on who needs the asset most
as expressed in willingness to pay. The following assumptions constitute a
benchmark for analyzing the importance of this factor:
(A1) In each period, both agents arrive to the good, and utilities are positive
for both agents.
(A2) In all periods, the probability that one agent arrives ¯rst is independent
of how much he or she values the good in that period.
(A3) For all subperiods i; utilities are independent of who obtained the good
in subperiods prior to the i'th subperiod.
Given (A1)-(A3), the optimal strategies and their resulting total pay-o®s
can be calculated as follows: If A has the dictatorial right (Ad), and if she
arrives ¯rst in period i, she will use the good if uiA ¸ uiB ¡ °; otherwise she
will at a cost ° o®er it to B at price uiB: If B arrives ¯rst, he will leave the
asset if uiA ¸ uiB ¡ °; otherwise he will ask A for permission to borrow the
asset for one subperiod at the rental price uiA: Hence, whether A or B arrives
¯rst, total utility will be max fuiA; uiB ¡ °g : If B holds the dictatorial right
(Bd), total utility will by symmetry be max fuiB; uiA¡ °g :The set of periods
for which uiB ¡ ° ¸ uiA will be referred to as ¸ while the set of periods for
which uiA > uiB ¡ ° will be referred to as n¸.
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The sum of expected utilities given Ad is then given by:
Utotal(Ad) =
X
¸
(uiB ¡ °) +
X
n¸
uiA
The sum of expected utilities given Bd is, by symmetry:
Utotal(Bd) =
X
w
(uiA ¡ °) +
X
nw
uiB
where the set of periods for which uiA ¡ ° ¸ uiB is referred to as w while the
set of periods for which uiB > uiA ¡ ° is referred to as nw. This brings out
the following results concerning how utilities determine the allocation of the
dictatorial right.
Proposition 1: If one agent's utilities is su±ciently high in all subperiods,
that agent should have the dictatorial right.
Proof: This is obvious and follows directly from the fact that when e.g. A's
utility in a given subperiod becomes su±ciently high compared to the utility
of B, she should get the asset in that period, and this is achieved without
bargaining if she has the decision right while it will only be achieved after
bargaining when B has the decision right (e.g. through arriving ¯rst). QED:
Proposition 2: Frequency of need counts more for the allocation of the dicta-
torial right than intensity of need.
Proof: This can be seen from the fact that very high needs (compared to °)
enter into the comparison only by their number and not by their magnitude,
since the agent with a very high need will obtain the good regardless of who
holds the decision-right, which only determines whether the agent will obtain
the good with or without bargaining. QED:
Proposition 3: A change in ° may change the optimal allocation of the dic-
tatorial right.
12
Proof: Consider the case where A rarely but intensely needs the asset and
relies on bargaining to obtain it she needs it, while B needs the asset frequently
but less intensely. If bargaining is not very expensive, it is likely to be optimal
to give the dictatorial right to B. A will then obtain the good when her need
arises, and B can obtain the good in most of the periods without incurring
the bargaining cost. If, on the other hand, bargaining becomes prohibitively
expensive, A will not obtain the good when her need arises, if B has the
dictatorial right. If A's need is su±ciently strong in those periods where she
needs the asset, in comparison with the sum of B's needs, then A should have
the dictatorial right16. QED.
Proposition 4: Given assumptions (A1), (A2) and (A3), the ¯rst-come ¯rst-
serve rule cannot be more e±cient than the dictatorial right.
Proof: Given the ¯rst-come rule (FC), if A arrives ¯rst, this corresponds to
the case where she holds the dictatorial right, making total utility in period
i equal to max fuiA; uiB ¡ °g : If B arrives ¯rst, total utility will by symmetry
be maxfuiB; uiA ¡ °g in period i: Total utility will therefore be
:5max
n
uiA; uiB ¡ °
o
+ :5 max
n
uiB; uiA¡ °
o
in period i and hence:
Utotal(FC) = :5Utotal(Av) + :5Utotal(Bd)
since when A arrives ¯rst, it is as if she holds the dictatorial right, and likewise
for B. Since the sum of utilities is the average of the sum under Av and Bd,
the claim follows. QED:
It will now be investigated under which circumstances the priority right pre-
vails. Given the assumptions mentioned above about what happens when A
has priority but B has begun using the asset, it will now be shown that the
priority rule does not have a rationale when both agents need the asset in all
periods:
16It may also be shown that the size of ° may a®ect the relative desirability of individual
and ¯rst-come when utilities are not always positive, but this is omitted.
13
Proposition 5: Given (A1)-(A3), and if uiA¡ °1 is positive in all periods, the
priority right cannot be more e±cient than the dictatorial right.
Proof: Consider the choice between Ad and the priority right Ap: Due to
symmetry, the following analysis applies to the choice of giving the dictatorial
or the priority right to B. In every period, A will either want the good for
herself or extract a payment from B (since uiA¡°1 is positive, A will not want
to simply leave the good to B). If the dictatorial right applies, A will use the
good herself when uiA > uiB¡°. If Ap applies, A will use the good herself when
uiA ¡ °1 > uiB ¡ °: Thus, when uiA > uiB ¡ ° + °1, A will use the good herself
under both rules; in this case the dictatorial right does better since it saves the
cost °1 due to the fact that B has not started using the asset, but has left it to
A who therefore does not need to communicate with B. If, on the other hand,
uiA < uiB ¡ °; A will extract a payment from B under both rules which means
that welfare will be the same whether A has one or the other right. What
remains to be analyzed is the case where uiB ¡ ° < uiA < uiB ¡ ° + °1: Then
A will extract a payment under the priority rule but will use the asset herself
under the dictatorial right. The comparison is hence between uiB ¡ ° and uiA
where the latter is higher, yielding the conclusion that the dictatorial right
is uniformly better than the priority rule when usage can be stopped. When
usage cannot be stopped, B will use the asset when he arrives ¯rst since by
(A1) his utility is positive and he cannot extract a payment from A who has
priority; thus, the priority rule excludes B from selling to A and hence induces
a welfare loss compared with the situation where B when arriving holds the
dictatorial right. Thus, the total expected utility when B arrives ¯rst is less
when A has priority than when B has the dictatorial right. When A arrives
¯rst, there is no di®erence between the situation where A has the dictatorial
or the priority right. Hence,
Utotal(Ap) <
1
2
Ad +
1
2
Bd
from which it follows that the priority rule is either dominated by Ad or by Bd
when usage cannot be stopped. QED
It will be shown below that the priority rule may well be optimal when one
of the two agents does not always arrive to the asset.
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3.2. The asset may be e±ciently allocated without renegotiation
Under some circumstances, the ¯rst-come rule and the priority right may
avoid renegotiation while the dictatorial right requires it. The ¯rst instance
of this can be seen when (A1) is relaxed; it will now be shown that if utility
is zero for one of the agents in one subperiod, this in favors the ¯rst-come
rule compared with the dictatorial right. Thus, if e.g. A has zero utility and
arrives at the good ¯rst, she may simply leave the good for the other agent
to use17; this will be pro¯table if the cost of contacting B is higher than the
payment that can be extracted from B. In this case, the ¯rst-come rule may
dominate the dictatorial right, since the ¯rst-come rule will costlessly allocate
the asset to the agent who wants it the most, while the dictatorial right will
not avoid bargaining costs in periods where the agent with zero utility holds
the dictatorial right. Thus:
Proposition 6: Given assumptions (A2) and (A3), the ¯rst-come rule may
dominate the dictatorial right when utilities are not always positive.
Proof: Since we only need to show that the ¯rst-come rule may dominate,
an example is su±cient. Thus, imagine that in every period one agent has
zero utility while the other's utility is lower than °, and that the agent with
zero utility alternates in each period. Then, given the dictatorial right, the
good will be allocated ine±ciently in every period where the one who has the
dictatorial right has zero utility. If A has the dictatorial right and arrives ¯rst,
she will not contact B, and if B arrives ¯rst, he will not contact A. Thus,
in every second period, total utility will be zero. The ¯rst-come rule will, on
the other hand, e±ciently allocate the good in all periods without bargaining
costs. Should the agent with zero utility arrive ¯rst, that agent will simply
leave it for the other agent, since it will be too costly to get in touch with the
other agent and establish an agreement18. QED:
17I am grateful to Oliver Hart for pointing this out to me.
18Note that this example also brings out the essential and quite obvious strength of the
alternating rule; if using the asset in one period means that utility in the next is small, the
alternating rule is likely to be optimal.
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Another instance where the ¯rst-come rule dominates the dictatorial right
occurs when (A2) is relaxed and when the probability of arriving ¯rst to the
asset increases with need. Thus:
Proposition 7: If the probability of arriving ¯rst is positively in°uenced by the
utility of the good in a given subperiod, the ¯rst-come rule may dominate the
dictatorial right.
Proof: This can be seen by assuming that two kinds of subperiods exist: In
the ¯rst kind, A has no need for the asset, while B does, and in the other
kind, B has no need for the asset, while A does. If in the ¯rst kind of period,
the probability is one that A arrives ¯rst, and in the second kind of period,
the probability is one that B arrives ¯rst, then the ¯rst-come rule realizes the
optimal allocation of the good without incurring bargaining costs, while e.g.
Ad incurs bargaining costs when B arrives ¯rst to the good in those periods
where A has no need of the asset. QED.
More generally, the ¯rst-come rule will economize more on the need for bar-
gaining the more an agent's e®ort to come ¯rst is increased with the utility the
agent derives from the asset. However, since e®ort is costly, it may be exces-
sive under the ¯rst-come rule, since a greater e®ort by one agent will impose
an externality on the other19. The usefulness of the ¯rst-come rule will then
depend on whether saved bargaining costs are more important than the cost
of e®ort in arriving ¯rst.
The assumption of time-separable utility-functions, (A3), will now be relaxed
to demonstrate a third factor that may obviate the need for renegotiation
under the ¯rst-come rule. Two important aspects of utility functions can
then be distinguished. First whether uses over time are substitutable and
second whether utility of the good in period 2 is higher or lower for an agent
when the agent has used the good in period 1, i.e. whether need is exhausted
19It is essentially the same reason why ¯shing e®ort will tend to be excessive. See Barzel
(1974) for a study of the case where arriving ¯rst comes at the cost of spending time in a
queue. Note also that under certain assumptions, a person who does not need an asset in a
period may choose to exert zero e®ort, i.e. to drop out of the race.
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through use. To express whether need tomorrow is increased or decreased by
today's use, the concept of super- and submodularity will be introduced20. If
we restrict attention to two periods, supermodularity arises when UA(1; 1) >
UA(1; 0)+ UA(0; 1)21, while submodularity arises when UA(1; 1) < UA(1; 0)+
UA(0; 1): The role of this distinction is made clear in the following.
First, note that in the case of two periods, when utility-functions for both
A and B uses over time are su±ciently supermodular the dictatorial right is
preferable to the ¯rst-come rule. To illustrate, if we let UA(1; 1) = UA(1; 0)+
UA(0; 1) + c and UB(1; 1) = UB(1; 0)+ UB(0; 1) + c, and c is large enough,
the same agent should of course use the asset in both periods, since this will
yield a higher utility than both UA(1; 0) + UB(0; 1) and UB(1; 0) + UA(0; 1).
A should then have the right if UA(1; 1) > UB(1; 1) and B should hold it, if
UB(1; 1) > UA(1; 1). In either case, the e±cient allocation will be obtained
without bargaining given the dictatorial right.
Second, as will now be argued, when utility-functions are su±ciently sub-
modular, the ¯rst-come rule dominates the dictatorial right when timing of
the use of assets is not important: If UA(1; 1) = UA(1; 0)+ UA(0; 1) + c and
UB(1; 1) = UB(1; 0)+ UB(0; 1) + c, and c is negative, intuitively the ¯rst-come
rule may be thought to dominate when it is important that the good is used
by one agent in one period and by the other agent in the other period, but this
is not su±cient. When the sequence of use is important - when it is important
e.g. that A uses in the ¯rst period, and B in the second - then the ¯rst-come
rule will not save on bargaining costs. In this situation, when B arrives ¯rst in
the ¯rst period, bargaining is saved under the dictatorial right (but not under
the ¯rst-come rule), while if B arrives ¯rst in the second period, bargaining
will be saved under the ¯rst-come rule (but not under the dictatorial right).
So there is no net gain to the ¯rst-come rule in this situation. The advantage
arises only when the sequence is not important. Then, when A (B) arrives
¯rst to the good in the ¯rst period, she will use it in that period, and in the
next period, B (A) will obtain it, possibly through bargaining. When the se-
quence is not important, i.e. when the parties can a®ord to be °exible about
20See Milgrom-Roberts (1995) for the general de¯nition of supermodularity.
21It is assumed that UA(0; 0) = 0
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who gets to use the asset in what period, bargaining in the ¯rst period can be
avoided given the ¯rst-come rule. The conditions of su±cient submodularity
and unimportance of timing can be stated formally as assumption 4 and 5,
respectively:
Assumption 4: UA(1; 1)¡ UA(1; 0) < UB(0; 1)¡ ° and UB(1; 1)¡ UB(1; 0) <
UA(0; 1) ¡ °
The ¯rst part means that when A used the asset in the ¯rst period, it is
worth shifting the dictatorial right in the second period to B; even at the
cost of bargaining. The second part means that if B used the asset in the ¯rst
period, it is worth shifting it to A in the second, even at the cost of bargaining.
Assumption 5: UA(1; 0) = UA(0; 1) and UB(1; 0) = UB(0; 1)
This implies that both agents are completely indi®erent about the period in
which they get to use the asset. It is not a necessary assumption, but one that
simpli¯es the analysis. Now:
Proposition 8: If UA(1; 0); UA(0; 1); UB(0; 1); UB(1; 0) are all greater than °
and Assumptions 4 and 5 above are ful¯lled, the ¯rst-come rule dominates the
dictatorial right.
The proof is in the appendix.
The point that the ¯rst-come rule may dominate when utility-functions are
submodular can be seen clearly when the possibility that the agents become
satiated (have no more need for the good) is explicitly introduced: If it is
assumed that using the asset in one period yields utility ¾ (> °) which is the
same for both agents, and that both agents are satiated in their demand for
the asset when they have used the asset a certain number of times ·; total
utility for A is given by
nP
i=1
xi¾ when
nP
i=1
xi · ·, and by ·¾ when nP
i=1
xi ¸ ·:
Similarly for B: Note the assumption that timing of uses is unimportant and
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that only the total number of uses counts. Then, the optimal strategy for
each agent is to use the asset in each period in which the agent arrives ¯rst,
until the point of satiation. In contrast, given the dictatorial right, bargaining
costs will have to be incurred each time the non-holder wishes to use the asset.
When the one who has the dictatorial right is satiated, the other will have to
ask permission, and thus incur the cost ° every time he wishes to use the asset.
In this example, due to utilities of A and B being the same, the advantage of
the ¯rst-come rule arises at the point where the one who has the dictatorial
right is satiated (and not before, since the good goes to the one who has the
dictatorial right in all prior periods without bargaining). Thus, when both A's
and B's utilities are the same in every period, the ¯rst-come rule will dominate
as soon as it is possible to satiate the one who has the dictatorial right. Thus:
Proposition 9: When satiation may occur as de¯ned above, i.e when the
number of periods n is greater than ·, and probabilities of arriving are positive
in each period for both agents, the ¯rst-come rule will dominate the dictatorial
right
Proof: Let n = · + 1: Given the dictatorial right the one who has this right
will obtain the asset in the ¯rst · periods. Then there will be bargaining in
the last period. Given the ¯rst-come rule, there will be no bargaining in any
period, and in every period, the asset will be e±ciently allocated. Total utility
given the ¯rst-come rule will be (· +1)¾, while based on the dictatorial right
it will be (·+ 1)¾ ¡ °: QED:
These insights lead to the conclusion that:
Proposition 10: The more utility-functions are super-modular and the more
timing is important, the better is the dictatorial right in comparison with the
¯rst-come rule.
The results presented in this section have concerned the ¯rst-come rule in
comparison with the dictatorial right. However, avoiding renegotiation is also
important for the choice between the dictatorial and the priority right. Giving
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priority to A is preferable to giving A the dictatorial right when A does not
arrive. If A does not arrive, and A has the dictatorial right, B will leave the
asset. He will not approach A who will not enter into a negotiation when she
can simply claim the asset. When A only has priority, B will either use himself
or approach A. Approaching A yields nothing since A may again claim the
asset, instead of entering into bargaining. Thus, B will use himself, and the
utility gained relative to the situation under the dictatorial right is hence
P
=T
uBi where =T is the set of periods where A does not arrive. On the other hand,
if A does arrive, the question is who arrives ¯rst. If A arrives ¯rst, there is
no di®erence between the two rules. If B arrives ¯rst, the di®erence is that
B may start using22 in which case A will have to acquire the asset through
contacting B at the cost °1: In this case, when A arrives and B uses the asset,
A may instead extract a payment from B in which case uBi ¡ ° is realized.
This latter possibility is also present under the dictatorial rule when A arrives
and B has left the asset for A to use. Thus, under the priority rule the utility
realized will be max
n
uBi ¡ °; uAi ¡ °1
o
while it will be max
n
uBi ¡ °; uAi
o
under
the dictatorial rule. Thus, when uBi ¡ ° > uAi > uAi ¡ °1; there is no di®erence
between the utility realized under the two rules; if uAi > uBi ¡ ° > uAi ¡°1, the
loss under the priority rule will be uAi ¡ (uBi ¡ °) which is less than °1 by the
inequality uAi > uBi ¡ ° > uAi ¡ °1; and ¯nally if uAi > uAi ¡ °1 > uBi ¡ ° the
loss under the priority rule compared with the dictatorial rule is °1. Thus, if
T ¤ is the set of periods where A arrives and uAi > uBi ¡ °, the upper bound of
the extra cost incurred by the priority rule is 12
P
T¤
°1 = °12 kT ¤k where kT ¤k is
the number of periods in T ¤.
Thus:
Proposition 11: Given (A2) and (A3), when usage can be stopped at no
(production) cost, priority to A is preferable to the dictatorial right when
°1
2 kT ¤k <
P
=T
uBi , where kT ¤k is the number of periods where A does arrive
and uAi > uBi ¡ °; and =T is the set of periods where A does not arrive.
22It is assumed that B will start using even if he may be interrupted later by A:
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This means that the important question is how often A will arrive and will
need the asset enough to interrupt B's use instead of extracting a payment
from B, and how often A will not arrive at all where B needs the asset. In
other words, if A needs the asset rarely but intensely (while B frequently
needs the asset), and °1 is not too high, the priority rule is preferable to the
dictatorial.
3.3. The role of uncertainty
Uncertainty may concern the mechanism - one mechanism may create a more
certain and predictable time-pattern of use than another- and uncertainty may
also concern needs.
The uncertainty created by the mechanism is especially important when
agents are risk-averse and when planning is important. When agents are risk-
averse in the sense that welfare is increasing but at a decreasing rate with more
access to the good, it becomes important that agents can be certain that they
will not be too heavily rationed in their access to the asset. This implies that
a highly risk-averse agent may insist on either the dictatorial or the priority
right or on the sign-up rule despite it's set-up costs. This is the principle that
contracting can be worth the cost when the elimination of uncertainty is im-
portant due to risk-aversion. Two more observations may be worth making:
the alternating rule also eliminates the risk of heavy rationing, while the dic-
tatorial and the priority right both implies that one of the agents is exposed
to this risk.
Planning may involve making commitments to others (as a precondition for
their commitments) and commitment may require predictability, i.e the ab-
sence of uncertainty. This aspect of planning and commitment connects to the
analysis above: both supermodularity and timing may be associated with the
planned use of the asset, for a plan often implies a timed, sequential scheme.
The main implication is that when planning is important, uncertainty should
be eliminated which it may be through the sign-up rule or the alternating rule.
The dictatorial and the priority right only eliminates uncertainty for one agent.
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Uncertainty concerning needs a®ects the choice of mechanism in a di®erent
way from the uncertainty created by a mechanism. Thus, the advantage of
predictable access vanishes when the need is itself unpredictable. If, for ex-
ample, a households needs a washing machine when the kids soil their clothes
and this happens stochastically over the week, the sign-up mechanism may not
not be useful. Then other mechanisms such as the ¯rst-come rule (especially
if the probability of arriving ¯rst depends on need) or the priority right to
the household with small children, may be optimal. This reasoning is remi-
niscent of Simon's view concerning the advantage of authority over contract
when there is a high degree of uncertainty. To model this aspect a stochastic
framework is required where utility follows some stochastic process; this is left
to future work.
4. Applications to the theory of the ¯rm and the theory of own-
ership
The relevance of the analysis to the theory of the boundary of the ¯rm can
be seen when the dictatorial and the priority right are interpreted as the right
within an employment relationship to direct the use of an employee's time.
The following example may illustrate: If the boss of law ¯rm A hires a lawyer
B to be part of A0s ¯rm, it means that the boss can, within limits, tell B to
work on the case of a big client if the need for this work should arise, while if
B is an independent lawyer, the boss would have to persuade B into working
on the client's case, which may not be easy, if B had planned to work on a
case of one of his own clients. Bargaining might then occur, and may reach the
optimal outcome, but this would come about at a cost that could well be high
if the need is urgent. There would of course also be a risk of a hold-up which
was not analyzed in this paper because it has been so extensively studied in
the literature. However, due both to the risk of a hold up and to the cost of
bargaining, A's ability to commit to the big client would be less if B were not
an employee. On the other hand, B's ability to commit to his own client is less
when he is subject to A0s directions in which case any given commitment to
B's own client may be interrupted by a direction given by A. The point is that
the assumption of renegotiation or transaction costs is su±cient to generate a
theory that incorporates both an advantage and a disadvantage of expanding
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the scope of a ¯rm. In brief, when B is independent, he does not have to
incur the costs of bargaining with A when he wishes to enter into a contract
with his own client,- this is an advantage of independence. On the other hand,
when if B is an employee, A can coordinate B's services in a predictable and
bargaining-free way with the services of other employees or partners of the law
¯rm without having to bargain with or persuade B- this is an advantage of
merging. Thus, when Coase (1937) pointed out the importance of haggling
costs to an understanding of the scope of the ¯rm, he could have argued that
these were, in principle, su±cient to generate a theory of the boundary of the
¯rm23.
The framework of the present article and some of the results derived above
are also relevant to the theory of ownership. The ¯rst-come rule is often,
e.g. in textbooks, associated with common or collective ownership while the
dictatorial rule is associated with individual ownership. However, this is only
partly justi¯ed. People owning assets together may use other mechanisms
than the ¯rst-come rule, e.g. the sign-up rule 24. Moreover, when an agent
owns an asset, he or she may allow others to borrow it, and the rules for
borrowing the asset may di®er; the priority right may e.g. be used instead
of the dictatorial. Thus, both individual and collective ownership may be
supplemented by implicit contracts, and while the form of ownership matters to
the determination of what happens when the implicit contract falls outside the
self-enforcing range25, it should neither be assumed that common ownership
is restricted to the ¯rst-come rule nor that individual ownership is restricted
to the dictatorial or the priority right26. Note also that the comparisons made
in this paper abstract from incentive issues, mainly the important fact that
23This is not to say, of course, that this factor alone can explain the observed boundaries of
¯rms; arguably, a one-factor, general theory of the ¯rm is probably not possible to construct.
24See e.g. Ostrom (1990). Also, clubs create mechanisms for sharing goods that are
neither purely public nor purely private goods (see Adams and McCormick on the continuum
of goods between private and public; for an overview of theory of clubs see e.g. Sandler and
Tschirhardt (1980)).
25As stressed by Baker, Gibbons and Murphy (2002a) building on Grossman-Hart (1986)
and Hart and Moore (1990).
26Nevertheless, a comparison of the dictatorial rights with the ¯rst-come rule remains
relevant to the theory of ownership, since the creation of individual ownership in reality
sometimes does replace the ¯rst-come rule of common (or no) ownership.
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individual ownership provides an incentive for creating and maintaining assets.
In general, it may be more fruitful to focus on the mechanisms themselves in-
stead of one the categories of individual and collective ownership. Focusing on
the concrete mechanism may even resolve, and throw further light on, disputes
in the theory of ownership, as the following example illustrates: In his early
contribution to the theory of ownership, Demsetz (1967) explains individual
ownership in terms of the internalisation of externalities. As an example of
the emergence of individual ownership, Demsetz mentions the rise of private
property rights for land among North American tribes when fur trading in-
creased. However, in a study of the actual (complex) structure of rights among
aboriginal people, Bailey (1992) criticizes Demsetz's view27; Bailey emphasizes
that when group hunting took place:
`a lineage group, a band, or village held common access, and the
private property rights of "nuclear' families were irrelevant until
the game was taken' (p. 191).
He concludes:
`I ¯nd that economic advantage sometimes rested clearly and pos-
itively with group exploitation of its entire territory'. (p. 195).
In terms of the mechanisms used, Bailey's observation is that Native Amer-
icans used the priority rule: Group hunting had priority over individual use,
but the individual land owner could use his land as he wished, as long as it did
not interfere with the hunting needs of the group. According to the analysis
above, this was optimal since the group were likely to need access very much
whenever it did need it, but did not need it very often. Whether one views
27As does Posner (1980) who argues that possessory rights ("usefruct") may be optimal
in a primitive society.
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giving priority to the group (for hunting-purposes) as a form of collective or
of individual ownership does not seem essential.
5. Possible extensions
The analysis of this paper can be extended in several directions, two of which
shall now be mentioned.
First, questions on the enforcement of mechanisms may be addressed. Breach
of the mechanism occurs; in the case of sharing of a washing machines e.g.,
this is known to be an area of anger and resentment between co-inhabitants.
The anticipation of such outcomes may in turn a®ect the choice of mechanism.
Thus, friends sometimes refrain from owning goods together for fear of losing
the friendship in case of con°ict. Furthermore, within the context of the model
it may be asked why the implicit contract stipulating e.g. a ¯rst-come ¯rst
-serve rule can be assumed to be adhered to while the parties cannot trust
a mechanism that asks each agent to maximize total surplus in each period
in which case all coordination problems could be solved28. But naturally an
implicit contract that relies on truthful revelation of private information (need)
is more fragile than an incomplete contract that relies on observables such as
who arrived ¯rst to the asset29.
Second, there exist a set of norms and preferences that a®ect how the implicit
contracts are played, especially within the private sphere, but which were not
included explicitly in this paper. For example, the norm that favors are repaid
in kind and rarely through monetary transfers among friends and relatives
was mentioned but neither explained nor taken into account in the model.
Also, when the model is applied to the private sphere of life it may be worth
considering that some people attach a high value to altruism and communal
living, and are hence less inclined to adopt individual property rights than
people who value privacy and individual freedom, in part because it involves
28The question would then be which governance structure is better at supporting relational
exchange as in Baker, Gibbons and Murphy (2002b).
29It was assumed that utilities were common knowledge but this assumption was made in
order to simplify the analysis of renegotiation and not for realism.
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acceptance of individual utility maximization. Or that to many people a well-
protected sphere of privacy, i.e. the certainty that some decisions cannot be
interfered with by others, is of importance in itself.
6. Summary of results
This paper has identi¯ed a set of commonly used simple mechanisms for
allocating assets or resources over time and analyzed some of the main de-
terminants of their e±ciency within the framework of incomplete contracting
and costly renegotiation. It has also suggested circumstances under which a
simple form of ex-ante contracting is likely to be more e±cient than the simple
mechanisms that rely on ex-post renegotiation.
It may be worth summarizing some of the main results concerning the choice
of mechanism.
One ¯nding was that both the dictatorial rights and the ¯rst-come rule can be
optimal. The dictatorial right, which enables the owner to make decisions con-
cerning assets or goods without asking anybody else, is e±cient compared with
the ¯rst-come rule when arrival probabilities are exogenous, utility-functions
are additively separable, and utilities are positive in all periods. However,
when either one of the three assumptions is not ful l¯led, the ¯rst-come rule
may dominate the dictatorial right. Mainly, the ¯rst-come rule is likely to be
preferable to the dictatorial right when
² the agent with the greatest need for the asset in a given subperiod is
most likely to arrive ¯rst in the subperiod (without spending too much
e®ort).
² timing is not very important (uses in di®erent periods are close substi-
tutes).
² uses over time are submodular, i.e. need is exhausted through use.
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Also, it was found that the priority right is preferable to the dictatorial when
the one who has priority often does not need the asset but when in need, should
get it. The the one who has priority may hence not be the agent who needs
the asset most often, it is likely to be an agent who rarely arrives to the asset.
The important thing is that when the agent arrives, the agent needs the asset
more than the other, as is often the case in a hierarchy.
The sign-up rule may be e±cient when uncertainty is costly due to risk-
aversion and when uncertainty of access makes it di±cult to plan activities
and make commitments. The sign-up rule permits both agents to plan, but
only when utilities are themselves predictable (non-stochastic). When utilities
are stochastic, the ¯rst-come rule may be preferable to `contracting' (the
sign-up rule), e.g. when probability of arriving ¯rst depends on need.
Appendix
Proof that the ¯rst-come rule is optimal when timing is unimportant and use
should change hands:
Given the ¯rst-come rule, we can derive utilities as follows: Let us assume
¯rst that A arrives ¯rst to the asset in the ¯rst period:
When A arrives ¯rst, she can choose to use the asset herself. If she uses it
herself in the ¯rst period, and also arrives ¯rst to the asset in the second period,
she will sell to B in the second period, since she can obtain the price UB(0; 1)¡°
which, by assumption 4 is greater than the gain in utility, UA(1; 1)¡ UA(1; 0),
from using the asset again in period 2. If A uses the asset herself and B arrives
¯rst in the second period, B will use the asset. Hence, A's utility from using
the asset will be UA(1; 0) +:5(UB(0; 1) ¡ °). If A does not use in the ¯rst
period, she may either sell it to B or leave the asset unused.
In the case where A sells to B in the ¯rst period, we will now derive the
price that she can obtain from B: Denote the price by p. This price can be
calculated as follows: If B pays p his total utility over the two periods will be
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UB(1; 0)¡ p+ :5( UA(0;1) ¡ °). If B does not buy the asset at price p, A will
use it rather than let it go to waste (since the utility of the asset is symmetric
in the two periods there is no reason to let the asset go to waste), and B's
utility will then be .5£UB(0; 1), since he will derive no utility if A arrives ¯rst
in the next period and presents him with a take-it-or-leave it o®er. Thus the
price p is given by:
UB(1; 0)¡ p + :5(UA(0; 1) ¡ °) = :5£ UB(0; 1)
which yields: p = UB(1; 0) + :5(UA(0; 1) ¡UB(0; 1) ¡ °): When A obtains this
price, his total utility from selling becomes: p¡ ° + :5 £ UA(0; 1), where ° is
subtracted since there is a cost involved in selling at price p. She will hence
sell if:
p¡ ° + :5£ UA(0; 1) ¸ UA(1; 0) + :5(UB(0; 1)¡ °)
implying that
UB(1; 0)+:5(UA(0; 1)¡UB(0; 1)¡°)¡°+:5£UA(0; 1) ¸ UA(1; 0)+:5(UB(0; 1)¡°)
which again implies:
UB(1; 0) ¡ UB(0; 1)¡ ° ¸ UA(1; 0) ¡UA(0; 1)
By Assumption 5, this cannot be ful¯lled, so A will use the asset in the ¯rst
period.
In the second period, A will sell it to B if A arrives ¯rst, while B will simply
use the asset if B arrives ¯rst. Thus when A arrives ¯rst, we obtain the optimal
allocation, and the expected bargaining cost is only °=2; since when A has used
to he asset in the ¯rst period, in the second period there will be bargaining
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only when A arrives ¯rst again which occurs with probability 12 . So when A
arrives ¯rst, we can infer that the optimal allocation is attained at an expected
bargaining cost of °=2. Since the case where B arrives ¯rst is symmetric to the
case where A arrives ¯rst (the exact same analysis applies), we can conclude
that the optimal allocation will be attained also in that case at an expected
bargaining cost of °=2. Since A and B both arrive ¯rst with probability 12 , we
can conclude that the optimal allocation is obtained given the ¯rst come rule
at an expected bargaining cost of 12£ 12 + 12£ 12 = 12:
Given the dictatorial right, the expected bargaining cost is higher. This
follows from Assumption 4, according to which the asset must be used by both
agents, but this means that the non-holder of priority must, in one of the
two periods, either ask for permission to use the asset or by having the one
who has priority sell it to him. Both ways involve bargaining which means
that bargaining is certain to occur given the dictatorial right. This proves the
proposition.
Note that it follows from this proof that when the optimal allocation is such
that the asset must change hands and it is important that A uses in the ¯rst
period (in which case B should use in the second), then there is no saving of
transaction costs of using the ¯rst-come rule. In this case, if B arrives ¯rst in
the ¯rst period, there must be bargaining (expected cost: °=2), and likewise,
if A arrives ¯rst in the second period (expected cost: °=2). The total expected
bargaining cost will then be °, as when either A or B has the dictatorial right.
QED:
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